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Across the Great Divide:
Integrating Comparative
and International Politics

JAMES A. CAPORASO

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ROBERT SCHUMAN CENTRE

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Integrating Comparative and International Politics**

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Introduction

Since the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War* (1959), much research and theory about international relations has been organized by his three levels of analysis: individual, state, and international system.¹ Other analytic categories have been used (interest groups, bureaucratic politics, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations). Nevertheless, most of the major debates in international relations (e.g., realism, neorealism, liberalism, institutionalism) draw on concepts that are theoretically organized around the state, national society, and international system, i.e., around Waltz's second and third levels.

While these levels of analysis have provided useful categories for organizing our research in international relations, they also direct our attention to a pronounced gap within the discipline as a whole between domestic politics and international relations. Many would say that recognition of differences between these fields is just as it should be. Domestic society and the international system are demonstrably different.² The latter is a competitive anarchy where formally similar states rely on self-help and power bargaining to resolve conflict. Domestic society (not system) is, by contrast, rule-based. Conflicts are resolved through appeal to institutions and law. International politics is concerned with survival; domestic politics has to do with life within the polis. While this view is stylized, the core distinction between domestic and international politics nevertheless survives and drives our thinking, often in ways not explicitly recognized.

Two general hypotheses can be advanced to account for the distance between comparative and international politics. The first is that it is due to the relentless academic division of labor. As scholarly specializations become more and more refined, problems of integration naturally occur. Subfields become more specialized and less accessible to the academic community at large. According to this view, the effort to provide cross-level integration represents a nostalgic

¹ Other sources in the systemic or "third-image" tradition are Walt (1987); Posen (1984); and Gilpin (1981). For an interesting early attempt to identify second-image sources of foreign policy, see Rosenau (1967). For an approach which links international relations with domestic politics and argues that changes in domestic structure and policies affect outcomes, see Katzenstein (1978). It is important to note that the work of Walt and Posen is not hostile to translation into explanations of foreign policy in the way that Waltz's systemic international relations certainly is. For a thorough account of the possibilities of using systemic theory to generate theories of foreign policy, see Elman (1996).

yearning for past times when renaissance scholars grasped domestic and international politics holistically. However, gaps due to this type of disciplinary fragmentation are in principle surmountable.² The second explanation is that both fields are intellectually autonomous, stand on their own foundations, and cannot be reduced to one another. Gaps due to differences of this type are not easily bridged. Some may argue that they are in principle unbridgeable. One strong account of this second position is provided by Kenneth Waltz, whose *Theory of International Politics* (1979)³ argues for the autonomous --hence nonreducible-- character of systemic international relations theory. The structures of the international system do not have domestic counterparts in the same way that domestic social structures do not have parallel microcosms at the individual level. If this position is believed, it rules out explanatory reductionism. i.e. the explanation of international phenomena by reference to second or first image factors. It does not necessarily rule out other bridge-building efforts.

Three possibilities for making these cross-level connections will be explored:

(1) strategic interactions and two-level games; (2) the second-image reversed;⁴ and (3) the domestication of international politics. In working out the possibilities of each approach, I rely on a Kuhnian exemplar in the first two categories. The first approach is set out and explained in *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, edited by Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson, and Robert Putnam (1993). The second approach is used by Ronald Rogowski in *Commerce and Coalitions* (1989). The third approach does not have a representative book under review.⁵ I will draw on some literature on international law, in particular on the "constitutionalization" of the European Union under the Rome Treaty, Single European Act, and Maastricht Treaty.

² One suggestion might be to rely upon generalists as "integrative experts," as in effect specialists in the connections among subdisciplinary bodies of knowledge. For imaginative suggestions along these lines, see Campbell (1969).

³ For example, if the distribution of capabilities is multipolar, we cannot say that country x is multipolar. The group property in this case is configurative rather than distributional (tall groups are on average made up of tall individuals). While information on the units is used, the composition of this partial information is different from the units themselves. The elementary units are the states. This is a question of ontology. But the configuration of state properties creates a new variable, in this case the distribution of capabilities.

⁴ The phrase "second image reversed" was coined by Peter Gourevitch (1978). The two-level game approach was pioneered by Robert D. Putnam (1988).

⁵ Nevertheless, in this section, I will rely heavily on research in international law, in particular, the work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet, Walter Mattli and Joseph Weiler.

In the remainder of this essay I will proceed as follows. First, since there are several problems of a meta-theoretical nature related to my focus on the connections between domestic and international politics, I address them briefly. Specifically, they concern the connection between the agent-structure and the levels of analysis debates and the reductionism controversy. Second, I will examine the literature under consideration and in so doing I will discuss the three approaches previously mentioned. Finally, I will offer some concluding comments on cross-level theories and how these approaches may themselves be compared and contrasted.

Meta-Theoretical Issues

(1) Levels of Analysis Versus Agents/Structures

Discussion of levels of analyses, and the research programs associated with these levels, quickly gets involved with ontological questions.⁶ There is a reason for this. Waltz's levels of analysis are not theoretically innocent. There are other ways to structure the possibilities for thinking about international relations. For example, there are the centers and peripheries of Wallerstein's world system theory (1974) and Cardoso and Faletto's dependency theory (1978), the global classes of Resnick, Sinisi, and Wolff (1985), and the social forces, states, and ideas of Robert Cox's Gramscian approach (1986). These concepts are difficult to match with Waltz's levels since they are neither subsets nor aggregations of neorealist theory. Stephen Gill's global capitalist hegemony (1990) can't be accessed either by progressive aggregation of Waltzian primitive concepts (such as the distribution of power) or by unpacking his most global (systemic) properties. That is, there is no way to go from Waltz's concept of multipolarity or bipolarity to Gill's concept of global hegemonic class. Waltz's framework, based on an ontology of states, is one and only one way of organizing contending approaches. The different approaches will affect not only our answers but even the questions we can ask. It should not be surprising that dependency theory and Gramscian approaches to world order are not part of the neorealist research program.

⁶ It is often said that levels provoke discussion of an ontological and epistemological sort. However, in a strict sense, issues of epistemology do not seem to be involved at all. Epistemology raises questions of theory, albeit the theory of knowledge. Ontology, on the other hand, concerns the ultimate nature of our subject matter. What entities, relations, and even logical operations do we admit? Ontology affects theory but does not uniquely determine specific theories. It is permissive and constraining, providing a kind of intellectual architecture that allows and rules out certain theories. For example, a dualist ontology of mind-body would rule out psychosomatic theory.

(2) Reductionism and Systemic Theory

Discussions of reductionism, systemic effects, and whether "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" are often confusing and are carried out within frameworks that don't allow us to arrive at useful conclusions. Two strategies are particularly unhelpful. The first strategy (exemplified by structuration theory)⁷ starts by identifying a set of macro concepts but defines these concepts in such a way that disaggregation is impossible. Individuals are embedded within structures logically. Both structure and agent become parts of an internal relation. To separate the two for causal purposes violates the definition. The second strategy, inspired by methodological individualism, starts from the opposite end, with the individual, but proceeds to expand the environment of individuals to include interactions with other individuals, memberships with other (groups), shared feelings (group loyalty, solidarity) and composition rules (rules relating individuals to social wholes). The former approach *defines* social properties as inherently non-reducible, as mutually constituted and co-determined entities (Wendt, 1987). The latter *defines* all social properties as combinations of parts and part processes. By expanding the vocabulary of the individual level to include complex interactions and even emergent effects, and by insisting that such effects are built from the bottom up --no matter how complex the chemistry-- macro theorizing is rendered impossible. A complex social accounting replaces social theory. In both cases, tasks which are potentially theoretical are preempted (and made definitional) by the way one organizes categories. Yet neither reductionism nor systemic theory is inherently fallacious. I argue that it makes sense to allow for (i.e. make possible) systemic effects (and reduction) and that doing so is not *ipso facto* obscurantist.⁸ A first-approximation definition of systemic effect is an effect due to the arrangement (configuration) of information about the units, rather than information about the units themselves. Whether the whole is greater than the sum of its parts is an interesting issue, but the answer to this question lies in whether composition rules (rules specifying interactions) count on behalf of the parts or the whole. Without answering this question *a priori*, the above approach provides a structure within which it can be answered in theoretical and empirical terms.

⁷ See Giddens (1979), especially chapter 2 ("Agency, Structure"). Alexander E. Wendt's work begins with "the Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory" (1987). Dessler's contribution to this debate is David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?" (1989). Also see Wendt, "Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations" (1991); and Hollis and Smith, "Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations" (1991).

⁸ To "allow for" simply means to provide the conceptual-logical space to pursue these issues in theoretical terms. Ontological decisions should not be allowed to preempt interesting theoretical issues.

(1) Two-Level Games

Originally inspired by Robert Putnam's 1988 article "Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games" and nurtured by a year-long study group at Stanford's Center for the Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences during 1988-1989, *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Evans, et al., 1993) brings together eleven case studies and two analytical chapters on international bargaining. The editors, as well as the contributors, seem dissatisfied with the unitary actor assumption often invoked in international relations theory, as well as the tendency of systemic theories to underpredict outcomes.⁹ Variations in systemic structure, particularly in the distribution of power, simply do not provide enough information to make specific predictions, either about the preferences of domestic leaders or about the outcomes of the negotiations themselves. There is also a revealed dissatisfaction with comparative politics approaches to manage these problems of underdetermination by offering descriptively rich accounts while leaving blank key portions of the theoretical story. A third dissatisfaction, the central one animating the book, relates to a standing partition between the chessboards of domestic politics and the international system. Analysis of moves and strategies (which are sequences of moves) on each board separately are common. Utilization of the analytical results of one level as inputs for the other are less common but not rare. The third category, simultaneous analysis of both games — the integration of domestic and international chessboards — is almost nonexistent. This book seeks to fill this void.

The central analytical device used to span the domestic-international divide is the two-level game. By itself it is not a theory but closer to a metaphor. It draws our attention to key actors and directs us to analyze the intersecting influences that converge around the Janus-faced state, facing simultaneously outward to the international system and inward toward various domestic constituencies.

⁹ To "underpredict" means that the theoretical information is insufficient to generate specific predictions about outcomes. Underpredictive theories come in several forms. They may provide information about necessary but not sufficient causes, may rest on probabilistic rather than deterministic reasoning, or may provide background information without stating the proximal causes. In a sense, any theory which is statistical, or lacks a necessary and sufficient inferential logic, or explains the limits within which behavior will fall without supplying point predictions, is underdetermined, hence underpredictive. International relations theory is not alone in this regard but systemic international relations theory, by explicitly arguing in terms of limits and possibilities rather than specific foreign policies, makes it easier to locate its limitations.

Each leader, called a COG for chief of government, must interact with and solve problems in two arenas. The COG must strike acceptable deals with his or her international partners and must ratify such deals within the relevant domestic institutions. There is an acceptability set, the set of deals agreeable to other COGs, and a win set, those deals which can be ratified domestically. No temporal priority or logical sequence is presumed. Both levels are important simultaneously. Both act as constraints and resources. Both are relevant for strategy at two levels. In addition, COGs may have utility functions of their own, preferences that may be constrained by, but are not identical with, those of their constituents. Two COG agents (or sets of agents), two constituencies (domestic actors), and two different rule systems must be taken into account.

Beyond this skeletal model, there is much flexibility in the way analyses can be carried out. The richness of institutional detail varies from chapter to chapter as does the focus on interest group life, the force of public opinion, and the importance of changing leadership, political parties, and electoral majorities. Chapters vary from the information-rich, relatively transparent political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, with well-developed, organizationally strong interest groups and public opinion, to the clan-based, personalistic rule in Somalia. In general, COGs in advanced liberal democracies were much more constrained by domestic influences than COGs in less developed countries.

The core of the book, lodged between a superb introduction (Moravcsik, 1993) and conclusion (Evans, 1993), are eleven case study chapters, most of them built around an explicit cross-national, longitudinal, or cross-sectoral comparison. These chapters cover much ground, including security issues (intermediate nuclear forces, Berlin crisis), economic issues (computers in Brazil, U.S. feed grain exports to European Community), and human rights issues in U.S.-Argentina and U.S.-Guatemalan relations. There are chapters dealing primarily with North-South relations (Pastor, Martin and Sikkink, Stein, Kahler, 1993), East-West relations (Eichenberg, Snyder, 1993), and West-West relations (Moravcsik, Eichengreen and Uzan, Milner, Kraus, and in part Odell, 1993).

Chapters vary greatly in terms of the level of institutional detail provided. Eichenberg's chapter (Eichenberg, 1993) dealing with the decision to deploy and then remove the intermediate nuclear forces provides details about the West German political system that are relevant to the making of agreements among COGs and their ratification domestically. The West German system of proportional representation allowed minority views to be represented, a fact that created problems for the Federal Republic's governing coalition. Germany's well-developed interest groups and the activism of her peace movement placed

constraints on Germany's leaders. The bargaining behavior of Schmidt, Kohl, Carter, and Reagan is difficult to understand apart from the domestic constraints in both countries. By contrast, Stein's findings suggest that domestic institutional constraints (apart from elections) are not very important. Sadat in Egypt and Begin in Israel were able to alter their domestic win sets by manipulating "domestic coalitions and procedures." (Stein, 1993:92) What counted instead were domestic economic crises and elections.

In explaining different outcomes of U.S. human rights policies in Argentina and Guatemala, Martin and Sikkink (1993) find that size of the win set is less important than the existence of transnational coalitions of human rights supporters. In Argentina they existed and U.S. influence was successful. In Guatemala they did not and U.S. policy failed. Perhaps extreme forms of brutality and repression still work but they seem confined to all-or-nothing solutions based on isolation and increasing opportunity cost of integration into the international economy. Stein finds that local and global power balances matter little in the negotiations at Camp David, in contrast to other studies (Telhami, 1990). She also found that the instrumental manipulation of domestic win sets to increase bargaining power did not succeed (leaders were not convinced about hand-tying arguments). Curiously, COGs were more successful manipulating win sets of their counterparts. Moravcsik (1993) in his chapter on cooperation in the production of weapons systems, provides still another variation on the two-level game model. He identifies two counter-intuitive findings. First COGs of different countries where arms production agreements were being made were closer to one another than to their own domestic constituencies. Agreements were easier among countries than within countries. Second, the incentive structures facing firms were generally more conflictual than those facing states. Thus domestic and international politics, usually identified with conflict and "we-they" thinking, is associated here with relatively benign incentives. Economics, traditionally the realm of harmony of interests and the discovery of areas of joint gains, is associated with conflictual incentives. Moravcsik finds that the major obstacle to negotiating agreements stems not from international structural factors, nor to the concerns of states with relative gains, but from the sensitivities of domestic economic actors to distributive questions, in particular how to apportion the research, development, and production tasks among powerful domestic interests.

Moravcsik does an excellent job of theorizing (rather than simply describing) domestic interests. In some of the other chapters, domestic interests either change exogenously or respond to factors so specific to time and place that they are not reproducible in other contexts. As such they lack generalizability. In Moravcsik's approach, the decisive variable which determines both the

domestic interest of big firms and the success-failure of negotiators is the global market position of domestic arms-producing firms (1992:136).

An important component of thematic coherence has to do with the overall design. This is rarely an issue that comes up at all in edited collections. Design considerations are thought to apply to particular studies — not to collections of them. The book employs the logic of research design at two levels, the first nested within the second. At the level of individual chapters, there is almost always a strategic contrast between countries, sectors (or issue areas), or time periods. Eichenberg examines changes across historical episodes and Stein employs concepts of learning across time. Moravcsik, Milner, and Kraus explicitly employ predominantly sectoral contrasts. Eichengreen and Uzan, Martin and Sikkink, and Kahler employ country comparisons, while Odell and Pastor exploit contrasts among issues and countries. These carefully chosen cases illustrate the inferential gains associated with employing theoretically informed comparisons.

The second level of design has to do with the logic of case selection as a whole. Here the focus shifts from the contrasts within chapters to the contrasts across chapters. The relevant contrasts are not between construction and semiconductors and Jamaica and Somalia but rather between Jamaica and Somalia as a pair and Nicaragua and Panama as a pair. As in a German *Rahmenerzählung*, where a story is told within a story, the units within the individual case studies are repositioned to take on different meaning at the level of the book as a whole. This is more than a question of scope of coverage. It also has to do with evaluating hypotheses. The studies of Jamaica and Somalia, Guatemala and Argentina, and Nicaragua and Panama illustrate, despite internal variations, the considerable differences between these cases and the German-U.S. INF dispute or the French-German negotiations over weapons collaboration. In the former countries, civil society is much weaker and domestic constraints on leaders' strategies not as strong. The attention paid to their constituencies by Schmidt and Kohl was much greater than anything witnessed in Somalia, Egypt, or Guatemala. Thus, as Evans points out in the conclusion, case selection served two principles at once: increasing the scope and generality of the empirical work and explaining the differences in outcomes within pairs of countries (1993:398).

Two classic principles of research design are internal and external validity. As outlined by Campbell and Stanley (1963), the former is a necessary component of all non-exploratory designs. Internal validity has to do with the basic question of what, if anything, made a difference. To answer this question, even in the most tentative way, a design must provide variation on the independent

variables and must control, to whatever extent possible, for confounding influences. The latter concern, external validity, relates to the generalizability of findings. If x affects y within Germany and France, does this same relation hold in other countries? Internal validity involves tests of hypotheses. External validity involves the scope of the results. The nested design of *Double-Edged Diplomacy* responds to both concerns.

A second strength of the book is that it has an exceptionally strong introduction and conclusion. Both serve as excellent road maps for the book as a whole (one prospective, one retrospective), while the introduction establishes the intellectual agenda and the conclusion reflects about the unfinished business ahead.

Moravcsik's introduction (1993) does far more than introduce the chapter contributions and set the mood for the book as a whole. It also provides a template for integrating international relations and comparative politics. His starting point is that "pure" international relations theories, because they are indeterminate, must permit domestic factors to enter, if only in an *ad hoc*, unsystematic way. Domestic politics should not be treated in piecemeal fashion, nor should it be placed in the service of shoring up the shortcomings of systemic approaches. Domestic politics is not necessarily about what is theoretically messy and intractable, and systemic international theories are not necessarily about what is parsimonious. Thus, domestic political theory should not simply fill in the detail left unexplained by systemic approaches, the "residual variance" approach. Instead, domestic politics approaches may specialize theoretically in any number of ways, e.g., in the activities of different interest groups and in the representational logic of domestic institutions. Theories of international politics may tell us more about power and bargaining.

Evan's conclusion (1993) provides an excellent synthesis of the book's findings. He reviews the patterns of evidence, even the negative ones, and provides a sense of direction about where the important questions remain. Since one of the major control variables in the design was time (most of the comparisons were from the post-1945 period), future work on two-level games could profitably add the historical dimension.

A third set of contributions centers on the findings of the case studies. One negative finding is that overall systemic theories, based either on power-security or economic vulnerability, are inadequate in the most direct sense that they underpredict or mispredict the outcomes. The Martin and Sikkink chapter (1993) provides the clearest example of this inadequacy. Argentina, far stronger and less vulnerable than Guatemala, nevertheless succumbs to U.S. pressure

while Guatemala holds out. There are many other examples, including the inability to explain the positions of Sadat and Begin in the Middle East (Stein, 1993) or the changes in Schmidt and Kohl's orientation in Germany (Eichenberg, 1993), on the basis of systemic factors.

Perhaps surprisingly, the weaknesses of systemic theory were not compensated by a strong theory (or theories) of domestic society. Evans, in reviewing the results, notes the absence of a strong constituency-driven logic in the chapters taken together, and this absence is particularly noted in the beginning, agenda-setting phase of the negotiations. Domestic forces become stronger as the negotiating process unfolds. Of course, the pinnacles of state power are not taken into account when noting this weakness. Presumably, if the agendas of political leaders were taken into account, the results would be different. But then, the nets thrown out would be quite comprehensive, encompassing domestic society, domestic politics, and the international system. Nevertheless, an important point remains. Our Janus-faced leader is neither a residue of systemic forces nor a passive reflection of societal forces. Both neorealism and society-centered pluralism are inadequate (not to say wrong) from the start.

Pursuing the negative findings, I think it is fair to say that no general positive conclusion was reached about the importance of the size of the win set or the ability to shrink or enlarge these sets at will. The theoretical expectation was that the leader with the smaller win set would be in the stronger position, since he or she would have only those options closer to the preferred position. Along the same lines, if political coalitions are fluid, leaders can easily stitch together their support base, thus changing at will what is ratifiable. But as Evans points out, leaders seldom tied hands (they preferred flexibility) and when they did so, "...their adversaries simply did not buy the argument." (Evans, 1993:402) There is a dual irony here, which perhaps retards the ability to play the "hands-tying" strategy. Among advanced constitutional democracies, where institutions are thick and organizational life is strong, rule-based or group-based opposition is plausible but transparent. Leaders may have their hands tied but this is not a tactic that can be exploited. If democracies keep few secrets, there are few informational asymmetries to exploit. Among less developed countries, where constitutional restraints are fewer and group life not as well organized, leaders may have great autonomy but since this autonomy is recognized by counterpart COGs, there is little room to exploit this freedom.

One important positive finding is that domestic institutions are important. Regardless of whether the forces confronting the COG originate in the international system or domestic politics, they are not transmitted to decision makers in a simple way. Domestic institutions are important in both filtering

these forces and in constituting the relevant actors. In 1934, the Trade Act was passed in response to some of the negative policy consequences of the Congress during the Depression. This Act removed much of the authority for making trade policy from the legislative to the executive branch. Greater executive autonomy meant a broader buffer between the protectionist feelings of mass publics and the policy-making process. Along the same lines, the system of proportional representation, for France in 1934 and Schmidt and Kohl during the seventies and eighties, seemed to make governing coalitions fragile. This was especially the case for the Daladier government, which attended the World Economic Conference in 1933. The Daladier government was but one of eleven ministries to hold power from May 1932 to May 1936 (Eichengreen and Uzan, 1993:219).¹⁰ The leeway of French representatives was limited to say the least.

The importance of institutions and organized group life are noteworthy in their absence. In Miles Kahler's chapter (1993) on the IMF and Jamaica and Somalia, domestic institutions were weak and many latent groups, in Bentley's terminology, were not capable of organizing to their advantage. In Somalia, Siyaad Barre was not willing to upset the delicate balance of clan interests on which his regime's support rested (Kahler, 1993:389). Even in Jamaica, further advanced in democratic terms, group losers were better organized than potential winners, and it was not at all clear that this pattern was due to the relative concentration of benefits and losses. The potential losers in effect vetoed an agreement with the IMF that would have brought substantial benefits to small farmers, consumers, and the informal sector (Kahler, 1993:390), and this quite apart from whether or not potential winners could have bought out losers. The Pareto concept has not yet taken root in many parts of the less developed world. Neither Barre nor Seaga availed himself of the opportunity to mobilize key constituencies who might have benefited from an agreement, an outcome that perhaps points to an incentive incompatibility between politicians and the economy.

Finally, out of all the predictors of successful outcomes of negotiations — size of acceptability sets, size of win sets, magnitude of consumer surplus, outcomes in accordance with power, *juste retour* — one of the most important unsuspected factors was the expectation (or fear) of absolute loss. Indeed, this was the central theme of Stein's chapter (1993) on negotiations in the Middle East, but it also figured indirectly in other chapters. For example, Odell's emphasis on the credibility of threats as a determinant of bargaining outcomes

¹⁰ See the extended discussion of French politics in *Double-Edged Diplomacy* (1993:190-194).

rests in part not just on the strategies pursued but also on the loss to the U.S. if the threat were not successful (Odell, 1993:237). The greater the perception of loss (relative to no agreement at all), the greater the urge to fashion some agreement. And this seemed to be true regardless of whether the agreement served some independent end or was the goal itself, i.e., an agreement to take home to the constituents.

Despite my praise of *Double-Edged Diplomacy*, I have a number of criticisms. My first critique centers on design, an issue about which I had many positive things to say. Many of the chapters selected cases because they differed on outcome. This amounts to sampling on the dependent variable, a strategy that has its limitations (Geddes, 1990).¹¹ The most obvious limitation is that there may be no relation at all between independent and dependent variables, and one way the absence of a relationship may be in evidence is by the absence of change in the outcome variable. In Figure 1, the independent variable, *x*, is assured of changing by design while the behavior of the dependent variable is contingent. When *x* is high, *y* is also high. When *x* is low, *y* is also low.

		Dependent Variable	
		High	Low
Independent Variable	High	Outcome Observed Cases Cluster Here	No Cases
	Low	No Cases	No Cases

Figure 1

¹¹ Geddes' chief criticism of selection on the dependent variable has to do with truncating the variance on the dependent variable, e.g., by only looking at successful or unsuccessful outcomes. The book under review completely avoided this problem by picking cases with diverse outcomes on the dependent variable.

The pattern of outcomes is consistent with the independent variable having an effect. However, it is quite possible that no relationship at all is observed, so that variation in the independent variable makes no difference. This is illustrated in Figure 2.

		Dependent Variable	
		High	Low
Independent Variable	High	(1) Outcome Observed Cases Cluster Here	(2) No Cases
	Low	(3) Outcome Observed Cases Cluster Here	(4) No Cases

Figure 2

In this figure, cases cluster in cells 1 and 3, displaying high scores on the dependent variable across different scores of the independent variable. Selection on the dependent variable rules out this pattern.

What is the practical impact of the removal of the "no-difference" outcome? On the principle that a theory is stronger to the extent that it withstands more difficult tests, this difficulty increases as a direct function of the falsifiable content of the theory. Thus, selecting cases for variation on the dependent variable reduces the number of outcomes that are inconsistent with the theory. There is a competing hypothesis that is impossible to test when cases are selected this way. Furthermore, since many outcomes are overdetermined, in the sense that many explanatory factors are consistent with the outcome data, it is not clear that this principle of case selection is optimal. Looking backward for consistent explanations after the outcome is observed does not provide as difficult a test as selecting cases for change in the independent variable to see if they are associated with previously specified dependent variables whose values have not been determined by design.

The second point relevant to the research design relates to the overarching (macro) design, the one within which the case studies are embedded. While Evans seems to see this macro design as increasing the scope of the study, thus improving external validity, more could have been teased out of the chapters by way of internal validity. Table 1 provides a schematic picture of how individual chapters and the pattern of chapters connect.

Table 1
A Macro-Micro Design

Cases*	Within-Chapter Comparisons	Across-Chapter Comparisons
Case 1	a_1b_1	\bar{x}_1
Case 2	a_2b_2	\bar{x}_2
-	-	-
-	-	-
-	-	-
Case N	a_Nb_N	\bar{x}_N

* Cases correspond to chapters.

The cases are chapters which then generate internal comparisons (a_1b_1 to a_Nb_N). These internal comparisons are the focus of each of the chapters. The logic of design directs each contribution to explore the reasons for different outcomes, given similarities in many contextual properties, including systemic structures. In addition, there are also across-chapter variations that can be exploited. $\bar{x}_1 \dots \bar{x}_N$ provides another distribution, this one made up of group (pairs) parameters. I use means for convenience but the same logic applies to distance scores and other parameters. Each pair (or n-tuple) of cases also (together) provides a value which as a set forms a new distribution. This new distribution now becomes the object of explanation. Why do outcomes become more cooperative (or conflictual) over time? From the most historically remote cases to the present, does synergy become more or less evident? As institutions become denser, say as one shifts comparisons from less developed countries to the advanced capitalist countries, does one find that COGs have greater or less flexibility? These kinds of questions, more relevant to internal than external validity, could also have been tested within the overall design. The importance

of these questions, and the difficulty of exerting leverage on them with a pairwise focus, suggests that the book would also have benefited from a few macro studies.

A second criticism has to do with the book's largely assumptive favorable orientation toward general equilibrium analysis over partial equilibrium. Indeed, this was a point Putnam made in his 1988 article, in which he criticized second-image (domestic causes of international effects) and second-image reversed (international causes of domestic effects) as "merely 'partial equilibrium' analyses." (1988:434) I am sympathetic with Putnam's goal of looking at the complete picture and not resting with a one-way analysis of the links between domestic and international politics. But this comprehensive picture could come about in two different ways: by combining partial analyses into a unified account or by conducting a simultaneous analysis of domestic and international levels. I argue that there is more to be said for the former approach than is conceded by the contributors, that partial models provide one way to build comprehensive models, and that such an approach may be more practically attainable than models that are comprehensive from the start.

In economics, partial equilibrium analysis is used to work out the prices and quantities that are produced within commodity and factor markets separately.¹² Supply and demand curves within markets are the operative forces. As Mansfield points out, "...each market is regarded as independent and self-contained" (1982:412) and local changes in prices in one market do not have significant impact on other markets. This assumption is not regarded as true in any final sense but rather as a useful first approximation to understanding a complex picture.

To describe the partial model in this fashion is to grasp the reasons that comprehensive models are preferred. We all know that the world is not partitioned into watertight containers, that processes which seem quite local probably have far-reaching if indirect effects, and that feedback and interaction are likely over the long and perhaps short run. However, while terms such as "interactive", synergistic", and "simultaneous" can have precise meaning, they also have a halo of unanalyzed connotations around them. In the abstract, apart from demonstrations of usefulness, interactive and synergistic are likely to be preferred to additive and separate. The underlying two-game approach, and the individual chapters applying them, would have been more impressive if they

¹² For discussions of partial and general equilibrium analyses, see Mansfield (1982:412-418); also Blaug (1980:187-192); and Weintraub (1977:107-123).

had pursued the limits of the partial model and demonstrated the superiority of the comprehensive approach in a value-added way.

I do not make this suggestion in an off-hand ("you should have tried this") way. Let me attempt to make the case for partial equilibrium analysis. Starting from the premise that everything is connected to everything else (no closed systems), we can also note that some things are more connected than others. In the physical world nuclear forces are much more powerful than molecular forces which in turn are more powerful than molar forces. In human affairs, we can speculate that individuals are more cohesive and tightly connected (despite "the divided self") than families, families more so than small groups, small groups more so than villages, villages more so than countries, and countries more so than international systems.

The "relative integrity of parts" alluded to above can be conveniently described in terms of relative levels of interdependency, functional autonomy, common fate, and the stability of "local" equilibria. A tightly coupled subsystem would demonstrate a high ratio of internal to external interactions, high functional autonomy, jointly experienced harm or benefit with other parts, and a local equilibrium that is invariant with respect to large changes in external constraints.

In "The Architecture of Complexity" Herbert Simon (1962, 1982:210) tells us that in complex hierarchically organized systems, variables may interrelate with one another irrespective of changes in their environments, within certain levels. For example, the day-to-day operations in a bureaucracy may be unperturbed by changes in higher level environments. Garbage may be collected, school boards may decide the content of biology textbooks, and roads may be built without setting off national alarms, at least most of the time. There are two issues involved. The first has to do with the strengths of subsystemic forces relative to those connecting these forces to the whole. The second has to do with the conditions under which the subsystem is stable. When subsystemic forces are strong, and when this subsystem retains its characteristic patterns under a large range of variation in the whole system, Simon speaks of the "near-decomposability" of subsystems (Simon, 1962, 1982:217). This partial decomposability allows us to treat systems in isolation from one another as a first approximation, to create modules or "islands of theory" for the purpose of later integration.

The superiority of the general over the partial equilibrium approach is easiest to make in horizontally specialized market settings. There is no clear hierarchical principle organizing the relations among commodity, service, and factor

markets, which is not to deny that the capital-labor relations — as a social relation — is free from hierarchy. In neoclassical theory, markets are set off from one another in terms of technical properties (mobility, substitutability, productivity). This makes it easier to integrate their respective behavior.

But social and political theory is different from the theory of market behavior precisely on this point. Politics is not just about exchange behavior among co-equal entities. It is also about power and control. Of course, the book recognizes this—why else the focus on negotiations? But if political life implies hierarchy, not just in the precise sense of power relations, but also in the broader meaning of a social organizing principle, then general equilibrium may make less sense. The greater the hierarchy, the tighter the part connections, and the broader the bonds defining the local equilibria, the more sense it makes to understand the parts first, reserving for second-order the task of linking them into a coherent whole.

Of the chapters in this book, the one by Snyder (1993) goes farthest in pushing the partial equilibrium model. He first carefully analyzes the parts (the behavior of the Soviet Union and the United States) and then links them sequentially. It is a model based on mutual interaction, and feedback, but not simultaneous and synergistic behavior. Snyder himself offers a reason why there might be less applicability of the two-level game in his case study, *viz.*, there are few cross-county coalitions in the area of security. But despite his qualification, I would like to have seen the limits of the partial model probed more if only as a precursor to the more general analysis.

(2) The Second-Image Reversed

In 1941, Wolfgang Stopler and Paul Samuelson authored a remarkable article, "Protection and real wages." The basic argument had to do with changing relative income as a function of changing exposure to international trade. What they showed quite convincingly in theoretical terms is that free trade harms (relatively) those owners of factors which are relatively scarce from a world point of view and benefits those who are holders of relatively abundant factors. While Stopler and Samuelson did not ask us to focus on distinct classes in a sociological or Marxian sense, the article directed attention to land, labor, and capital as productive factors and to the accrual of income resulting from ownership and use of these factors. Starting from given facts about relative factor abundance and scarcity, individuals gain or lose depending on their holdings of land, labor, and capital. To this extent, "Protection and Real Wages" and later *Commerce and Coalitions* (Rogowski, 1989) have ties to classical political economy.

While the Stopler and Samuelson article set forth an important thesis rich with suggestions for income distribution and class cleavages, it was largely unrecognized in the political science literature. No doubt this in part reflected the mutual isolation of economics and political science. This isolation is corrected, and Stopler and Samuelson are introduced to the literature on trade politics by Ronald Rogowski in *Commerce and Coalitions*. In this book Rogowski argues that the Stopler-Samuelson theorem need not stop with changes in relative incomes. These changes are not random (they occur quite predictably) and they are unlikely to be accepted passively. Those who gain (lose) are likely to understand this and take action to further (resist) these trends.

The economic cleavages caused by trade exposure provide the raw material of politics. Cleavages, by themselves, represent only economic data. The journey from here to organized groups, coalition-formation, and influence on governmental decision makers is a long one.

Rogowski's basic argument is that economic cleavages have political consequences of a predictable nature. Three reasonable assumptions are made: that groups which benefit and lose will be aware of it and try to further (or retard) the changes; that those who increase wealth will expand political influence; and that political entrepreneurs will invent mechanisms to overcome obstacles to collective action (1989:4-5). And in what is a most refreshing assumption, actual and potential losers will not be impeded from organizing to prevent loss because of the total potential welfare gains or by the promise that winners will buy out losers (1989:17).

If exposure to trade creates political divisions, it should do so in a determinate way. Starting from the three-factor model of economics (land, labor, and capital) Rogowski distinguishes advanced from less developed societies in terms of capital-abundance and scarcity. Given this basic division, four major configurations are possible, as indicated in Figure 3.

		Land-Labor Ratio	
		High	Low
Economy Advanced	(1)	<u>Abundant:</u> - Capital - Land <u>Scarce:</u> - Labor	<u>Abundant:</u> - Capital - Labor <u>Scarce:</u> - Land
	(2)		
Economy Backward	(3)	<u>Abundant:</u> - Land <u>Scarce:</u> - Capital - Labor	<u>Abundant:</u> - Labor <u>Scarce:</u> - Capital - Land
	(4)		

Figure 3

An economy may be (1) abundant in both capital and land and scarce in labor; (2) abundant in capital and labor, scarce in land; (3) abundant in land and scarce in capital and labor; and (4) abundant in labor, scarce in capital and land.

As sparse as these combinations are, they generate rich possibilities for politics. When labor and capital are on opposite sides (cells 1 and 4), class conflict results. When land stands alone arranged against labor and capital (cells 2 and 3), rural-urban conflict results. For example, looking at cell 2, both labor and capital should benefit from increasing exposure to trade (the entire urban sector). Both urban workers and capitalists should stand together against landowners and peasants in support of free trade.

A different kind of urban-rural conflict should arise in cell 3 when land is the relatively abundant factor and labor and capital are relatively scarce. Rogowski terms these "frontier" societies where farmers and pastoralists are holders of abundant factors and hence favor free trade, against the interests of workers and capitalists. The other two cells (1 and 4) predict class conflict, since labor and capital are on opposite sides (i.e., one is abundant and one relatively scarce).

These are the pure analytics of Rogowski's theory, the logical combinations and the political patterns, *grosso modo*, likely to result from these combinations.

Commerce and Coalitions is a powerful book, one that has broken new ground in the connections between comparative and international politics. Rogowski brilliantly utilizes our collective capital stock and creatively extends the logic of Stopler and Samuelson's half-century old essay into the political realm. Part of the force of the book lies in the relentless way in which the implications of well-known ideas are pursued, another part in the rather intriguing ways in which specific historical episodes are reinterpreted (Bismarck's marriage of "Iron and Rye," the coalition of Western agrarians with Northern industrialists against slavery, the effect of the European Union on groups within member states). While the book is simple in its appeal to a few factors to explain a great range of historical examples, it is by no means obvious. Indeed, there are many non-obvious implications of the theory and I would imagine that the book will provoke numerous debates in the economic history journals.

Second, the empirical work, although far from conclusive, is at a minimum very suggestive of the theory's explanatory power. Rogowski does not claim to provide a definitive test of his theory, but only a series of plausibility probes and illustrative case studies. At a minimum, the basic theory is suggestively applied to late nineteenth century Germany, the modern European Community (now European Union), slavery and populism in the U.S., the U.S. electoral realignment of 1896, the governing coalitions of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, Barrington Moore's interpretation of German fascism, sixteenth century Europe, and the decline of the Roman Empire.

Third, as indicated by my earlier comments, the level of analysis at which Rogowski carries out his research is welcome to this reviewer. In domestic and international political economy, research is often pitched at the level of the international system, the national economy, the industrial sector, or the firm. The international system emphasizes the overall structuring of the international division of labor; the nation-state stresses variables such as economic growth, distribution, macro-economic policy, and national adjustment styles; the industrial sector approach examines variables such as degree of concentration of capital, technological volatility, research and development embodied in particular sectors; and firm-specific studies focus on management strategies, market shares, competitiveness, and so forth.

By contrast, Rogowski focuses on economic factors: land, labor, and capital. While these categories are quite broad, analysis at this level of aggregation has

much to recommend it, especially when one puts on the theoretical lenses for the long view. In the short run, the logic of specific sectors may be compelling. There may be little overall unity among shoes, clothing, textiles, airplane production, chemicals, and automobiles. In a cross-section, or within shorter time periods, factors may be viewed as inextricably tied to or "trapped" by specific sectors. Over the longer haul, however, factors are mobile. They adjust to changes in relative scarcities and preferences.

Another benefit of the factorial approach is that it shifts attention from the political correlates of particular economic sectors to a level appropriate to more macroscopic factors. The sectoral approach suggests interest groups organized along industry (or service, agricultural) lines. The factorial approach points us toward broader coalitions of interest groups, political parties, unlikely combinations that cross sector lines (iron and rye), and to some extent classes. The factorial approach has more obvious links to historical sociology, electoral realignments, and the ascendance-decline of major economic groups.

Commerce and Coalitions also has its shortcomings. Perhaps the most striking is the gap between cleavages and outcomes. Rogowski recognizes and mentions several times that the book is about the relationship between trade and economic cleavages, defined in terms of changing income distribution. All well and good, but the book would not attract our interest if the story stopped here. Cleavages are merely matters of economic fact. They point to objective differences in incomes of holders of land, labor, and capital. They become politically interesting as people come to recognize their collective predicaments, to imagine that they can change their lot, and to mobilize politically, through interest groups, political parties, and broad-based coalitions. While economic cleavages are important in economic terms, they provide only the raw material for political movements. It is "holders of factors *für sich*" not "holders of factors *an sich*" that is important. There was little theoretical work on how to make the transition from cleavages to political mobilizations to outcomes. In this sense, a more accurate title of the book would have been *Commerce and Cleavages*.

A second limitation concerns the high level of aggregation at which the analysis was carried out, namely that of undifferentiated factors. I don't deny that Rogowski should have started with the assumption of homogenous factors, but I am skeptical about how far analysis can be pushed based on aggregation of such diverse forms of labor and capital. Labor, for example, could be separated into skilled and unskilled categories. This disaggregation would help to explain some of the effects of international competition on U.S. workers during the 1970s and 1980s. Low-skilled workers suffered a decline in real

wages during this period but the higher skilled workers increased their earnings somewhat. In other words, real wages of the most and least skilled diverged markedly from 1979 to 1989 (Economist, 1994:69). The heterogeneity of capital is probably as important — if not more so — than the heterogeneity of labor.

Turning to another point, the Stopler-Samuelson theorem assumes mobility of factors. If demand for capital-intensive production declines, owners can shift capital to labor-intensive sectors. The greater the mobility of factors, the more sense it makes to focus on factors, since the important changes will take place here. To the extent that factors are trapped within sectors, a sectoral approach is implied. But there is another explanation, not completely separate, that should be taken into account. Just as factors may be in varying degree trapped inside a sector, they also may be trapped inside a country. The restriction of cross-border flows of both capital and workers is a case in point. However, the difficulty and cost of exiting are variable even absent political controls.

What is the significance of this differential ability to exit? If both labor (scarce) and capital (abundant) are trapped inside a country and trade expands, then both are threatened by trade more so than under assumptions of international mobility. To be sure, capital can gain by moving across sectors, by disinvesting in some sectors and investing in others. But this may be a lengthy and cumbersome process and one that is impeded by the asset specificity of certain kinds of capital as well as the opportunity for rent-seeking. In contrast, with international mobility, capital can stay in the same sector and move to a different place. Labor, because it is less mobile, is trapped. An important outcome, the changing positions of labor and capital on protectionism, may be due to differential mobility. This may fall under the heading of short-run adjustments to Rogowski, but it is important nonetheless.

Commerce and Coalitions prompts us to think about the relation between domestic and international politics and between economics and politics. On the latter score I am reminded of how much significance economic theory attaches to market adjustments as well as private coping, while political theory is about struggling and public coping with the disruptions of the very same market. The Stopler-Samuelson theorem adds a long-run twist to these adjustment processes, downplaying the problems of the transition as frictional in favor of the long-run efficiency of the outcome. Depending on the actual mobility of the factors involved, the process could take decades or generations. Structural adjustment may come eventually because of environmental selection pressure rather than behavioral changes on the part of economic agents — evolutionary rather than psychological learning. Retired workers in steel and automobiles

may be replaced by software designers or clerks. Capital in firms that fail may reinvest in industries with different factor-intensity profiles..

What economists and political scientists bracket and take for granted differs. The economist's "long-run equilibrium" is easily transmuted into the hurly-burly world of politics simply by peering within the time frame required for these adjustments to take place. For the economist, the hindrances that come from sunk costs, a worker's familiarity with a certain productive way of life (a job or career — not just an income), inertia, and the time, energy, and knowledge required to find new work and investment opportunities, can all be blackboxed and treated as frictional resistance. For political science, these resistances define an important part of our subject matter.

(3) The Domestification of International Politics

A third bridge between domestic and international politics is provided by the concept of domestification of the international system. If the international system is a competitive anarchy in which sovereign, constitutionally distinct states interact on the basis of power and interest, then domestification describes the process by which that system becomes less anarchic, more "governmentalized".or more rule-governed. The "domestic analogy"¹³ (Suganami, 1989) used here suggests a continuum ranging from the most anarchic, asocial international system at the one extreme to world government and world society at the other. Clearly, these two variables do not have to move together. An "anarchical society" is not only possible but central to the work of Hedley Bull, and others working within the Groatian tradition (Bull, 1977).¹⁴ Historical international systems are never completely anarchic: some degree of rule and common understanding are deeply embedded within the system. Nevertheless, this continuum provides an ideal type for assessing the placement and movement of concrete international systems.

Inquiring into the conditions which make anarchic international systems more like domestic polities forces us to clarify just what it means to be a domestic polity, as opposed to a system of states freer of centralized rule. Recognizing that we are dealing with ideal types, a domestic polity is taken to be a political

¹³ At its broadest level, the term "domestic analogy" embodies a faith, or "presumptive reasoning" as Suganami puts it, "that there are certain similarities between domestic and international phenomena" and that "in particular, the conditions of order within states are similar to those of order between them; and that therefore those institutions which sustain order domestically should be reproduced at the international level." (1989:1)

¹⁴ For a thoughtful treatment of Bull's work, in the context of a modern debate about "cooperation under anarchy", see Alker (1996).

system characterized by stable authority patterns, patterns of recognized rule, i.e. what we commonly call government. While coordinative rules are important, as are shared political understandings and background knowledge, the strongest test of domestication lies in the existence of specialized institutions for making and adjudicating laws and interpretations binding on parties. In a certain sense, the domestic analogy relies on the creation of hierarchies of norms the most formal of which are laws (legislation). Such a hierarchy is better developed (more consistent, more formalized, and more complete in its vertical ordering) within domestic polities than among them.

This third approach differs from the other two in an important way. The first two approaches take the domestic and international levels as given and inquire about the connections between the two in terms of strategic interaction and cross-level processes (trade and coalition formation). Models based on mutual feedback, or synergy, represent the highest form of synthesis. The third approach asks to what extent domestic and international politics differ, in terms of deep organizing principles, then interprets these differences as ones of degree (not kind), and proceeds to investigate the ways in which the international system may acquire the characteristics of domestic politics.

Integrating domestic and international politics, according to the third approach, requires the (partial) elimination of the conditions defining separateness. The research project underlying this approach is historical and conceptual-historical because this process necessarily unfolds over time, conceptual because it is not just "there" for us to see but needs to be studied according to certain concepts. Unlike the other two approaches, this one does not involve cross-level theorizing. Or more accurately, it starts out as cross-level theory and "ends" with the fusion of international and domestic levels of analysis. "Bridge-building" is an inappropriate metaphor for this exercise. The islands that are being connected in two-level games and second-image reversed approaches are now being merged into one. Structural geology replaces civic engineering.

Many scholars will immediately disagree with the formulation presented above. After all, the world is organized into territorially exclusive, sovereign nation-states. While these states operate within an interdependent environment, they retain the ultimate right to decide. This is the essence of sovereignty. The global economy is integrated, the international division of labor is specialized, but the overall political structure of the world is decentralized. Some authors lament this fact, claiming that our political structures are outmoded, slow to catch up with our high-speed economy, unsuited to a world of open borders and rapid economic change. Computers, satellites, and the virtually instantaneous flow of information have made institutional dinosaurs out of nation-states.

Others celebrate this world, pointing out that it is highly functional for capitalism (it fosters competition, accents regulatory differences, gives practical meaning to "exit"), and conserves multiple traditions of diversity and freedom. A world of many states is likely to preserve a multicultural world and prevent a single, inevitably hegemonic, yardstick from being applied to all.. Whichever way the normative evaluation goes, the world system is still seen as "state-centric". Interdependence and limitations on autonomy "yes" but the erosion of state sovereignty "no".

Nevertheless, I pursue a more radical metaphor in this section, a metaphor of political integration among states not based on interdependence but more on a structural merger of their constituting principles, i.e. their constitutions. To give focus to this discussion, I will direct my comments to Western Europe, specifically to the fifteen member states of the European Community. While domestication (and constitutionalization) may apply to other parts of the world, its greatest relevance is to Western Europe. From the standpoint of the integrated rule of law, the EC is the most highly developed region of the world. Yet, some scholars treat Europe as if it were unique and required a theory *sui generis*. My presumption is the opposite, namely, that Europe, while "advanced" on the issues of concern here, is not qualitatively different from many other parts of the world, and that other parts of the world will experience pressures toward a thickening of the legal and institutional environment that Europe has felt earlier and more intensely.

In the remainder of this section I provide a sketch of the essentials of the process of constitutionalization at the international level. This process inevitably involves the creation of an international state and the redefinition of the domestic state. While this international state is limited (in membership, explicit authority, scope of competences, and especially powers to tax and spend), it is, nevertheless, in political and legal terms, a state.¹⁵ We often "miss" this emerging state because we expect it to look like formal government first of all, and secondly, we expect it to look like the Westphalian state in miniature. The emerging European state is not at all an embryo of established nation states. Its basic structure, or template, is quite different. It does not have a core government, a strong centralized bureaucracy, nor authority structures radiating out from a center to all reaches of its jurisdiction. It has almost no power to tax and spend. It is not an issue of "immature state" or "not enough time to develop", standard assertions often used to "explain" why the European political structure does not look like that of France, Italy, the United Kingdom,

¹⁵ For a fuller treatment of the EC as a Post-Westphalian state, see Caporaso (1996).

or Belgium. This state, powerful as it is, is not following the developmental outlines of nation states that exist today.

The Westphalian state system, which is first of all an ideal, refers to the system of territorially exclusive nation states each of which has an internal monopoly of force and the ultimate right to decide with regard to its internal affairs. Rights are completely separate from capacities so there should be no confusion that since a state has a particular right, this confers a commensurate ability. Sovereign rights confer recognition, provide claims to membership in international organizations, and access to resources from other states. Sovereignty also implies a right to domestic non-interference. States may differ radically in their internal arrangements and external powers but they all have sovereignty. This much is definitional. Sovereignty is required to play the game.

The Westphalian system simultaneously creates two orders, a domestic one and an international one. Within the state, rulers can make laws, implement them, and punish infractions by relying on police powers. The domestic order is hierarchical or vertical. The sovereign has the authority to make and execute laws. In domestic politics, laws are binding in the end because they can be enforced, regardless of whether or not they are legitimately made. The positivist critique of international law is that, since there is no international sovereign, laws cannot always be enforced, and if they cannot be enforced, they are not laws at all. In contrast to the domestic order, the international system is arranged horizontally. In legal terms, states are equal. One state does not stand toward another in the manner of a sovereign to its subjects but rather as one sovereign to another. Despite occasional extra-territorial attempts to enforce national policies, states do not pass laws that they expect citizens of other countries to obey. By the same logic, citizens of one country do not ordinarily expect to derive benefits from the laws of another.¹⁶ The German word for citizenship, *Staatsangehörigkeit*, means “belonging to a state”, suggesting that rights and duties flow from membership in sovereign political communities and are not conceivable outside of these communities. However, it is precisely the above claims related to sovereignty and citizenship that are being severely challenged today. These challenges are not being made abstractly but on quite concrete and practical grounds, often having to do with difficulties encountered

¹⁶ Of course, citizens of one country routinely derive benefits from those of another indirectly, as a result of the ways that rules in one country affect economic performance, whose effects in turn are transmitted to another country. For example, if state A establishes a central bank, or revises its rules regarding monopolies, these rule changes are likely to affect economic performance, a portion of which will be transmitted to other countries.

in travel across borders, working in “foreign” countries and making and enforcing contracts outside one’s home state.

Two central principles can be distilled from this brief discussion of the Westphalian state. First, since it is only states that have legal personality, it follows that only states can enter into international agreements and, in turn, that states exclusively can create binding rights and obligations. Individuals, private corporations, interest groups and so on do not have such legal personality at the international level and hence can’t claim remedies before international tribunals. The second principle concerns the lack of a clear hierarchy between domestic and international law. Two different legal orders exist.¹⁷ If a rule from one order conflicts with a rule from another, a procedure (a rule) is needed to resolve the dispute. In principle, and in practice, the meta-rule may decide in favor of domestic law, international law, or either one depending on some circumstance, such as which law has become effective the more recently (*lex posteriori*).

These two principles --the legal personality of states and lack of a clear hierarchy between domestic and international law--are central to the Westphalian model of statehood. Yet is it just these two principles that are challenged by our third method of overcoming the comparative-international divide. The central organizing concept, one that subsumes both changes in state agency and the indeterminate relationship between domestic and international law, is constitutionalization¹⁸.

Constitutionalization refers to a process by which a treaty, an international agreement, entered into by states, becomes relevant for individuals within these states. In more elaborate terms, and in reference to the European Community specifically, the constitutionalization of the treaty system, “... refers to the process by which the EC treaties have evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign states, into a vertically integrated regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligations on all legal persons and entities, public and private, within EC territory. The phrase captures the transformation of an intergovernmental organization governed by international law into a

¹⁷ I am simplifying here, recognizing that both dualist and monist traditions of law exist. The Netherlands, for example, has a monist tradition and was one of the first members of the European Community to accept the superiority of EC law. See Mattli and Slaughter (1996).

¹⁸ The concept of “constitutionalization” is used and explained by Federico Mancini (1991). It is extensively elaborated by Stone Sweet (1994). Also see Stone Sweet (1995); and Stone Sweet and Caporaso (1996).

multi-tiered system of governance founded on higher law constitutionalism.” (Stone Sweet and Caporaso, 1996:13)¹⁹

Constitutionalization implies deep integration. It entails a process whereby the Treaties entered into by member states, i.e. compacts among sovereigns, (Treaty of Rome, Treaty on European Union) become relevant for the individuals within those states. While this process did not occur overnight, there are some punctuation points. Since the early sixties, the domestication of the European polity has been proceeding, quietly at first, then later with greater fanfare, attention, and conflict. Its first moves forward, embodied in the judgements setting forth the doctrines of “direct effect” and “supremacy”, took place in 1963 and 1964, were dramatic only with hindsight. By the eighties, the European Court of Justice had set forth a significant jurisprudence covering substantial areas of policy. Apart from the content of these decisions, interesting in its own regard, this jurisprudence is important in a formal sense. The Court’s activist agenda wrought a jurisprudence that effectively challenged the two cornerstones of international law discussed previously: that international law refers to compacts among sovereigns; and that there is no clear hierarchy of norms between national and international law.

How did this remarkable process, this deep transformation in the relationship between domestic and international law, take place? Much energy has been spent in argument over whether the ECJ or national governments initiated and controlled the process. Far more interesting are the results, and the ongoing process itself, which no doubt requires collaboration between supranational institutions such as the Court and the Commission, as well as national executives, legislatures, and courts. The ECJ was responsible for developing two lines of jurisprudence that set this transformation in motion, one concerning “direct effect” and the other “superiority” of European law over national laws. Direct effect takes on importance in that it addresses the limitations of international law flowing from the fact that sovereignty confers legal personality on states. Superiority deals with the relationship between national and Community law.

Simplifying greatly, the Court progressively made the Treaties relevant to individuals, firms, and other private actors. In the *Van Gend en Loos* (1963) case, the ECJ declared that the provisions of the Rome Treaty created direct effects, i.e. that these provisions created rights and responsibilities for individuals without supplementary actions by national political institutions to

¹⁹ See also the extensive discussion by Stone Sweet in “Constitutional Dialogues in the European Community” (1995). Also, Mattli and Slaughter (1996).

translate Treaty provisions into domestic law. In doing this, the Court propounded a radical doctrine, broke down a partition between international and domestic law, and created a mechanism to provide judicial remedies for individuals acting with reference to international laws.

Fragments of this constitutionalized Treaty can be seen in the Court's Judgement:

"The objectives of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that *this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states*. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of *institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens*." (European Court Review, 1963:1)

Before the Van Gend en Loos case, member states could sue one another and the Commission of the European Community could bring actions against member states. Against this standard, the doctrine of direct effect confers on individuals rights and responsibilities that must be respected by public authorities and can be enforced in national courts (Stone Sweet and Caporaso:14). National courts enter the picture through the "preliminary reference procedure" (article 177) . When a national court has before it a case for which EC law may be relevant, the presiding national judge may (or in some cases must) ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the matter. This ruling is then applied by the national judge to the "domestic" case at hand. The vast bulk of the Court's case load is driven by the "preliminary reference" procedure, a process that at once lessens the antagonism and distinctiveness of national and international courts.

Since the Van Gend case, the Court has thickened its jurisprudence of direct effect by extending this doctrine from Treaty Provisions to Directives (Van Duyn, 1974) and other classes of secondary legislation. In 1983, the Court announced the doctrine of "indirect effect", which responded to a gap in the ability to sue another private actor. By instructing national judges to interpret national laws as if they were in conformity to Community law, the Court empowered national judges to rewrite national legislation. Once national laws are so rewritten, private persons can use EC law in litigation against one another. What started out as a thin wedge of constitutionalization of important Treaty provisions, has become a thick jurisprudence connecting individuals to Community law. Furthermore, this constitutional process does not present itself as an external force, intruding into domestic life in an alien way. Through the article 177 preliminary reference procedure, the development of Community

law is also the development of domestic law. The Court has discovered, or evolved, a decentralized enforcement mechanism that relies on the initiatives of self-interested actors, acting through their own national courts, which are themselves connected in an organic way to the ECJ (Stone Sweet and Caporaso, 1996:15).

In expounding direct effect, the ECJ revolutionized the relationship between domestic and international law. By providing individuals with judicial remedies and legal standing, it significantly closed the gap between treaty law and municipal law. Yet, conferring rights and responsibilities on individuals would not by itself have much legal force if municipal law could override Community law. Direct effect cannot realize its full effect in isolation from the superiority principle itself. Its consequences are felt only in conjunction with progress in the superiority of Community law.

These two principles -- direct effect and supremacy-- go together, logically and in terms of the ECJ's jurisprudence. In 1964 (one year after *Van Gend en Loos*) the Court examined a case involving an Italian citizen (Costa) and a public utility company. Mr. Costa refused to pay a \$3.00 utility bill saying his rights under the Rome Treaty (under article 37, having to do with discrimination) had been violated. The Italian Constitutional Court heard the case first and was immediately faced with a contradiction between Community law and the Italian law. Since no clear hierarchy of norms existed, the Italian Court argued that *lex posteriori* controlled. Since the Italian legislation establishing the public utility was subsequent to the Rome Treaty, Costa lost his case. After this decision, the ECJ tried the case and also found Costa's claims wanting but did not agree with the reasoning of the Italian Court. In announcing its decision, the ECJ asserted its doctrine of supremacy, and at the same time necessarily repudiated all national *lex posteriori* doctrines to the extent that they contradicted European Community law (Stone Sweet, 1995:9-10).

The ramifications of the supremacy doctrine, in conjunction with direct effect, are profound.

The supremacy doctrine lays down that in any conflict between an EC legal rule and a national law, the European rule has sway. In the *Simmenthal II* case (1978), the Court argued that at the moment an EC rule comes into effect, it "renders automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of ...national law". (Simmenthal, 1978)²⁰ National courts did not take this doctrine lying down and intense battles ensued in Italy, France, and the United Kingdom. The

²⁰ *European Court Reports* (1978)

Court's jurisprudence asserted Community law as superior to domestic law, eliminated the *lex posteriori* doctrine, and called into serious question domestic prohibitions on constitutional review of legislative acts. Given the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in most member states, the assertion of judicial review (at the international level) was strong medicine for national courts and legislatures to take.

It is important to reflect on these legal developments in Europe for their significance there and for what they might portend in the rest of the world. These developments amount to what Joseph Weiler has called "A Quiet Revolution" in Western Europe (Weiler, 1994). The organization of the world into sovereign states has meant that, legally, states have been the most important units, the ones with the right to make and break treaties. The pronouncement and expansion of direct effect pierces a hole in the legal armor of states and opens a transnational space for individuals and groups to seek international redress for alleged wrongs against them. Unfair labor practices, gender discrimination in the workplace, violations of maternity rights (again limited to ties to the labor market), violations of competition laws, and restriction on free movement are just some of the legal grounds that might serve to organize litigation for individuals and groups. In short, direct effect confers legal status on individuals in international law, or what the ECJ chooses to characterize as a new "Community legal order", separate from both domestic law and conventional international law. This is indeed a revolutionary development and one that erodes one of the mainstays of the Westphalian state system.

Conclusions and Further Discussion

In this article, I have presented three stylized accounts of how the domestic and international levels can be linked. Throughout, I have insisted that ontology and theory are distinct though related enterprises. In any large-scale social process, smaller units make up larger ones, almost as a matter of definition. Thus, the international system is made up of states, which are in turn made up of sub-national units such as provinces, which are in turn made up of towns, then families, and individuals. Recognizing that wholes are made up of parts commits oneself to an ontological reductionism in a straightforward accounting sense. However, this is quite different from saying that a theory of the workings of system x (say the modern international system) is dispensable since one can substitute for it a theory written in terms of the constituent units. This is theoretical reductionism. I have committed myself to an individualist ontology while permitting non-reductionist stance toward theory. I do this not because I

think theoretical reduction is fallacious but because I think it is unlikely to succeed here. Explanation in terms of smaller units is not more basic, satisfying, or better on *a priori* grounds. Terms such as division of labor, hierarchy, and multipolar are decomposable only by greatly altering the meaning of words, and how they are used in a particular theory.

Of the three approaches I have dealt with, one is suited for the analysis of particular events (two-level games), one for cross-level processes (second-image reversed theories), and for one institutional integration (domestication). Two-level games are uniquely appropriate for situations in which there are at least two distinct governments at odds over some issue, but where negotiations could in principle yield joint gains. Also, we must be looking at situations where strategies are relevant, i.e. where it makes sense to look at outcomes as dependent on what others do as well as one's own action. Given these conditions, the logic of two-level games can be quite illuminating.

Double-Edged Diplomacy, and the forerunner article "Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games," have already generated a considerable research program.²¹ Much of this work is of an applied nature but, as in the edited book, we learn a great deal about bargaining strategies, the relationship between constituents and leaders, and the conditions under which bargaining success occurs. Theoretical innovations also take place, as in Iida's introduction of "analytic uncertainty" into the two-level game model. Less work has occurred as part of a research program spurred by *Commerce and Coalitions*.²² While it is still early (recall that the *Double-Edged Diplomacy* book was preceded by Putnam's 1988 article), it would be a shame if comparative and international political economy lost the opportunity to follow up this important piece of research.

I will close by offering some suggestions about the future directions in which research might go, focusing first on the two-level game. This model could profit by a rigorous comparative exploration of the logics of partial and sequential games, with the general equilibrium logic and simultaneous modeling advanced in the book. As indicated earlier, I think there is more promise for the partial approach than is reflected by the contributors to *Double-Edged Diplomacy*. Second, comparisons of the two-level game with the standard one-level, unitary rational actor bargaining model might be useful. Carrying out these comparisons amounts to a suggestion that the importance of

²¹ For a sample of these works, see Huelshoff (1994); Iida (1993a); Iida (1993b); Schoppa (1993); and Lehman and McCoy (1992).

²² For an exemplary work following Rogowski's lead, see Midford (1993).

the two-level game should be gauged in value-added terms, as an improvement over the predictions of standard bargaining models.

Conventional international relations theory adopts a unitary rational actor viewpoint. Many critics point to the descriptive richness of domestic politics and rest their case here, ignoring the more important next step of demonstrating what difference this complexity makes for international relations. This is a critical step, since as Achen points out, it is possible to model a complex domestic environment with a single decisionmaker (Achen, 1988). So the critical question is how can we model negotiation processes in a way that is consistent with domestic politics and under what circumstances might this imply the necessity of a two-game approach? We can distinguish at least three different cases. The first is the one normally cited by realist theory, namely that we have the overriding force of the international system (an external crisis, a war or threat of war) and domestic politics simply fade away. Government agents act on their own because they believe they in fact act on behalf of all. The second situation involves cases where domestic politics affects the COG's preferences. What society wants is transmitted to central decisionmakers who quickly adopt the wishes of the populace. In the limiting case, the COG is a pure agent whose utility function is identical with that of his constituents. In the third and most interesting case, COG preferences differ from those of society. In the first and second cases, domestic politics, even if it counts, is dispensable, since domestic preferences are transmitted to COGs. In the third case, however, the COG simultaneously represents domestic constituents and searches for acceptable deals with counterparts abroad. He must find bargains that are acceptable to other COGs that can also be ratified domestically.

Within this third category, we can distinguish different types of cases. If COG preferences are different from constituents, then a two-level approach is illuminating, though it reduces to a kind of constrained maximization. The COG would first (arbitrarily) find those outcomes acceptable by himself and COG partners, then arrange the remaining outcomes in order of COG and constituent preferences. The chosen outcome would be the one that is highest (by some algorithm, e.g., the mean of the two preferences) for both.

Two general points emerge. The first is that the existence of domestic politics (in the sense of different actors pursuing different goals through different channels, goals that may not easily collapse into one overall preference ordering) does not necessarily imply a two-game approach. Second, to the extent that preferences diverge (preferences between COGs and domestic actors) and to the extent that they are changeable, through hand-tying or reverberation strategies, a two-level approach is called for.

What about the research program flowing from *Commerce and Coalitions*? Picking up on an earlier point, the gaps most in need of filling lie between the initial trade-induced inequalities and political outcomes defined in various ways: electoral changes, patterns of change in group mobilization, policy changes, and social-political realignments. How do objective changes in the distribution of national income, between labor and capital in particular, work their way through the political system? Cleavages do not automatically result in group mobilization. Information about one's position and how it is shared by others, i.e. a sense of common predicament, are required. This is likely to be a subjective process in which ideas as well as interests play a key role. Objective changes in national income, even if they hit some groups demonstrably harder, do not automatically translate into identifiable changes in politics and public policy. Workers, faced with job loss, may not be able to identify the underlying causes. The foreclosure officers of the local bank or teachers of global education in the high schools may be singled out as villains. Scapegoating and expression of generalized political discontent, i.e. anomic violence rather than purposeful political organization with clear goals and targets, may be the rule. So the first step in Rogowski's model (recognition of the problem) is not trivial.

What makes a difference for effective organization? Does the geographic concentration of factorial changes count? If labor is the disadvantaged factor, as it seems likely in the United States, does it matter if job loss is spread thinly throughout the country, or concentrated in the upper Midwest or Northeast? What counts? Is it the perceived importance of the industry or service to the country (say steel vs. textiles), the demographic makeup of disadvantaged groups (women, Blacks, the very young and very old), the links of these disadvantaged groups to Senators and Representatives in the Congress, or the leverage of these groups with the electoral college?

A second area where work is needed lies in a more fine-grained analysis of the productive factors, a point well-recognized by Rogowski. Labor and capital are too broad. They may serve as "first-cut" approximations, but they will have to give way to analyses based on various gradations of skilled and unskilled labor and capital that vary along numerous dimensions: asset specificity, mobility, degree of technical change, and knowledge-intensiveness. As labor and capital are disaggregated into finer groupings, these groupings will take on some of the features of the sectoral approach. Nevertheless, it is at this more specific level that the interesting political work is likely to be done.

Unlike the first two approaches, the third one relies partially on a domestic analogy whereby the separate units (states) integrate with one another to form a different and more comprehensive order. Whether this larger order is similar to

the constituent states, a larger version built on the same architectural principles, or proceeds down a different developmental path in historically novel ways, is not the main point here. What concerns us is that separate states, independent and not possessed of a common government, transform themselves, modify their sovereign capabilities, and merge in significant ways. The seeds of this approach are present in Bull's work on "anarchical society", even though Bull himself was not a proponent of the domestic analogy.

However, within the fifteen member states of the European Community, the domestic analogy goes beyond a society of independent states existing in an anarchy. Instead, we see the development of common rules and understandings, shared political institutions, even a constitution which interprets the Treaty framework so as to make key provisions relevant for individuals. In so doing, the ECJ has carved out a niche, a transnational niche, for individuals to bring complaints before an international tribunal.

I have used the domestic analogy in a suggestive and metaphorical way only, as a source of insight and hypothesis rather than as a source of proof. I reject the strong meaning of "analogy" attached to it by Suganami (Suganami, 1989), that the conditions of domestic order must be the same at the international level. In so doing, I cast my lot with Bull (1977), Manning (1972), and even (on certain reading) Hobbes ({1651} 1962), all of whom see the international condition as somewhat distinct from the state of nature of people without a government.

But to concede that important differences exist is not to deny similarities. States also benefit from a system of common understandings, habits, and taken for granted procedures and rules. Whether these rules and procedures take the form of a complex system of coordination providing rules of the road for parallel but constitutionally distinct units, or a vertically organized system of law, a hierarchy of norms akin to domestic law, remains to be seen. Both types of order already exist in Europe and there is no reason why one or the other must triumph. In as sense, this issue is being actively debated within Europe today, in the controversy stirred up by the German Court's pronouncement that the European Community is a *Staatenbund* not a *Bundesstaat* (a confederation of states not a federal state).

In this article, I have emphasized the ways in which Europe has become "polity-like". A powerful civil society exists at the transnational level as well as an emerging international government constructed on the basis of common rules. Europe is not only a society in Bull's sense, it is also an emerging polity. The nature of this polity has been strongly shaped by the authority which the members states have been willing to delegate and by the power of the ECJ to transform an international treaty into a constitution for Europe. Civil society

implies interest groups; delegation implies experts; and law implies courts and judges. Europe has plenty of all three. This fact alone speaks volumes about the nature of the international state, a state where interest groups, judges, experts, and national representatives meeting regularly decide European policy -- policy not in the sense of compacts among states but as laws binding on individuals and public authorities. Despite all the difference between this state and pre-existing ones, the international state I am describing qualifies in the simple sense that it is a system of public authority with the capacity for making, interpreting, and implementing binding laws. The members of the EC may operate in an environment that is intergovernmental but it is not anarchic; they pursue their "own" interests but not within a system of self-help.

The final approach, raises profound questions for the entire discipline of international politics.

International politics have been conceived as the politics among sovereign, territorially organized nations states. Legally, the system of sovereign states is horizontally organized while, at the same time, power-political relations are organized vertically. One central question that has divided lawyers from realists concerns the extent to which a system or rules (a legal system) can spread to encompass relations among states that were previously governed by power, either military power or the power of the market. States have already to a large extent "lost" the capacity to control their own borders, at least in terms of economic interactions. To a large extent, this capacity has been consciously given away, partly in the interest of efficiency. This has been a political process too, not just an efficiency project, with holders of mobile forms of capital benefiting more than others. In addition, territoriality, that central constitutive principle of the Westphalian system, has been called into question. In the area of social policy, not even one of the most developed in the European Community, states have conceded extra-territoriality in many ways, allowing beneficiaries who are not nationals even as they continue to support their own citizens while they work in other countries. As Leibfried and Pierson (Leibfried and Pierson, 1995) have shown, state control over beneficiaries, the types of benefits, and place of consumption (of benefits) have all deteriorated in the wake of even small movements in the labor market and market compatibility requirements of the single market. And finally, even sovereignty, considered as the ultimate right to decide, is thrown open to question given the power of the ECJ, the supremacy doctrine, and the growing hierarchy of norms among the national and European levels. While these forces are far from having played themselves out, the assault on sovereignty has gone furthest in Western Europe. This part of the world will continue to be the site where the contests between interstate politics and a more rule-based European politics take place. If this is

true, it will be Europe that will tell us a great deal about the appropriateness of our scholarly paradigms in the years ahead.

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